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1 Introduction
We consider a situation in which the publisher of an academic journal as a university bulletin such as Okayama
Economic Review tries to maintain the number of contributions to the journal for every issue. The possibly
simplest way for the publisher to do this is to pay a certain amount of pecuniary reward to each contributor,
which is indeed the incentive scheme currently adopted by the Department of Economics of Okayama
University. For the later use, we call such an incentive scheme a constant per−capita payment scheme because
each contributor receives a constant amount of money regardless of how many people have contributed. Under
this incentive scheme, an unexpected drastic increase in the number of contributors causes a proportional
increase in the total amount of incentive payments, which may exceed the budget of the publisher. It is therefore
worthwhile investigating another sustainable incentive scheme that keeps a certain quantity of contributions,
especially when the budget of the publisher of the journal is tight.
We propose an incentive scheme under which the total amount of payments for an issue is constant over time
and is equally distributed among all the contributors for every time. Hence, the monetary gain reveiced by each
contributor can vary with time, depending upon the total number of contributors for the issue. In this sense, the
setting of this scheme is more or less strategic among potential contributors. When only few people contribute,
then each contributor gains much. On the other hand, when many people submit a paper to the journal, each one
obtains only a little payoff. Since the total amount of payments is fixed under this scheme, we refer to it as a
constant total payment scheme.
Turning the situation above into a simple dynamical model, we analyze what will happen when the constant
total payment scheme is adopted. We also compare these two incentive schemes to see which one is more
efficient, that is, which one leads to more contributions given the total amount of payments.
The remainder of this note is organized as follows. Section 2 derives the model that consists of boundedly
rational (or adaptive) agents who, under the constant total payment scheme, make a discrete choice whether to
contribute a paper to the journal or not. Section 3 gives some comparative statics results for the steady state
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which is compatible with rational expectations. In Section 4, we characterize the dynamics of the model,
showing that the model is capable of exhibiting periodic as well as chaotic fluctuations. Section 5 gives some
computer simulations focusing on bifurcation diagrams and Lyapunov exponents. Section 6 examines the policy
implications from our study. Section 7 summarizes our findings.
2 Derivation of the model
Let us consider a time−invariant group of agents (e. g., the faculty members) of size N who are potential
contributors to an academic journal. Time extends from 0 to infinity in a discrete manner. The total amount of
incentive payments for an issue has been annouced to be B  0 at the beginning of time 0. Let yt [0 1] be the
fraction of the number of those who contribute at time t against the number of potential contributors (i. e., N ).
We will refer to yt as the contribution rate at time t . At the beginning of each time period, each agent does not
know how many agents will contribute at that time. At time t , all potential contributors commonly expect the
contribution rate at time t to be xt [0 1] (called the expected contribution rate), which is formed according to
the conventional adaptive expectations formulation :
xt xt1(1)yt1, 01 (1)
Note that when0 the expectations are sometimes called naive or myopic. The expected monetary payment
to each contributor at time t is approximately represented by
B
Nxt
. (2)
It is natural to assume that contributing a paper is costly (negatively or positively) for every agent but the cost
will randomly vary with time and among agents. To capture this idea, we assume that each potential contributor
at the beginning of each time draws a lottery which determines her cost of that time from a time−invariant
probability distribution which is common to all potential contributors. To be more specific, the cost of
contribution of agent i at time t , vi t , is given by
vi t v i t , (3)
wherei t is a zero−mean i.i.d. random variable, v R is the common mean cost, and  0 is a constant that
affects the variance of vi t . To obtain an explicit model, we assume that the probability distribution from which
is drawn is the logistic distribution :
L (z )Prob(vi t z )Prob(v z )
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  1exp v z    1 (4)
Potential contributor i at the beginning of time t has to choose either to contribute a paper to the journal or not,
so as to maximize her expected payoff. If she chooses not to contribute, her payoff is zero. If she chooses to
contribute, her expected payoff is given by
B
Nxt
vit . (5)
She will therefore choose to contribute if B(Nxt )vit . Given the expected contribution rate xt , the
contribution rate at time t , yt , is thus expressed as
yt   1exp 1  v  BNx t     1 (6)
Combining (6) with (1) yields the following first−order difference equation :
xt1 f (xt ) : axt (1)  1exp 1  v  BNxt     1 (7)
Note that since f ([01])[01] for any  , the map f : [01] [01] is well defined. Figure 1 depicts a
typical graph of the map f for plausible parameter values.
3 Some comparative statics
We first consider the case in which the potential contributors correctly forecast the contribution rate. That is,
xt  yt  : y . (8)
This is just the steady state (actual and expected) contribution rate of equation (7), i.e.,
y   1exp 1  v BNy    1. (9)
One can easily check that the above equation has a unique positive solution. Now let us see how the steady state
y varies with the parameters. Let
z   1 v B
Ny
  
.
A simple computation gives
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 y p   yZp1exp(Z )yZy ,
where p stands for some variable involved in Z and Zk ’s denote the partial derivatives with respect to k . Since
we have Zy 0, ZB 0, Zv 0, etc, we obtain the following comparative statics results : y B 0,  y v 0,  y 0, and  y N 0.
The first two results are intuitive : an increase in the total incentive payments (the cost of contributing a paper)
will increase (decrease, respectively) the contribution rate. The third one seems somewhat unintuitive : this may
imply that higer variety in the costs of writing a paper for contributors will induce a higher rate of contribution.
Related to the fourth result, it is interesting to investigate the effect of an increase in the total number of
potential contributors on the number of actual contributors, i.e., Ny . Differentiating Ny with respect to N gives Ny N  y N  y N () 0 ⇔ 1() ,
where(0) is the elasticity of contribution rate with respect to the number of potential contributors, i.e.,   y N
yN          .
An implication of the above result seems a little bit paradoxical : even if the publisher of the journal tries to
Figure 1. A typical N−shaped graph of the map f０.
α＝０．７, B＝１０, N＝４０, v＝２, σ＝０．０８.
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widen the admissibility of potential contributors so as to raise the number of actual contributors, it may rather
result in a decrease in the number of contributions when is big.
4 Dynamical analysis
4.1 The homogeneous case
Now we turn our attention to the dynamical situation. In what follows, we derive some dynamical properties of
fgiven by (7). To do this, we first consider the case of  0, that is, the homogeneous case in that all the
potential contributors share exactly the same cost structure. Equation (7) turns out then to be the following
piecewise linear difference equation :
xt1 f0(xt ) :  xt 1xt  if x t cif x t c (10)
where c  BvN 0. We refer to the discontinuity point c as a threshold. Note that the threshold corresponds
to the rate of contribution for the perfect foresight case. The dynamics of the class of piecewise linear maps such
as (10) are well known. For some economic applications, see Böhm and Kaas (2000) and Ishida and Yokoo
(2004a). Apparently, if c 1, unrealistic though, then each trajectory xtt 0 generated by (10) for any initial
condition x0 	[01] converges to the fixed point 1. We will thus investigate the dynamics of (10) for
0c 1. Although it is known that (10) can generate various types of periodic cycles depending on the
parameter values, a complete description of the dynamics is out of our scope. We will therefore focus on the
following specific type of periodic cycles of period n (n 2) :
p1 c pn pn1


p3 p2, (11)
where pi1 f0(pi ) for i  12


n 1 and f0(pn ) p1 . A straightforward computation can verify the
following proposition :
Proposition 1 : Let 	(01) be given. For any integer n 2, the map f0 given by (10) has a periodic cycle of
period n of the form (11) if n1
k 0n1k  BvN  n2k 0n1k . (12)
Furthermore, the cycle is globally attracting.
4.2 The heterogeneous case
Unlike the map f0 for the homogeneous case (i.e.,  0), the map f for the heterogeneous case (i.e., 0)
has no discontinuity. Exploiting some mathemaical theorems on the properties of continuous maps on the
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interval, we show that the fixed total payment scheme can give rise to chaotic behavior of the (expected and
actual) contribution rate.
Let g : I  R  I be a continuous map, where I is a closed interval. We say that the map g is topologically
chaotic if there is a natural number m and a compact gm−invariant subset   I on which gm is topologically
semi−conjugate to the full shift on two symbols. For more conceptional details, see e.g. Block and Coppel
(1992). There are some easily applicable sufficient conditions for the existence of topological chaos for maps of
the interval. For example, the following theorem seems well known. If g has a periodic orbit (= cycle) of period
n 3 which is not a power of 2, then g is topologically chaotic. Some consequences of the existence of
topological chaos are :
(i) the co−existence of infinitely many periodic cycles of arbitrarily large period ;
(ii) the map gm restricted to  , denoted by gm , is expansive , that is, there is  0 such that for
xy  (x y ), gkm(x )gkm(y )      for some k ;
(iii) gm  is topologically mixing , that is, for any non−empty open sets VW   , there is l such that
gkm(W )	V for any k l .
See Onozaki et al (2000) and Block and Coppel (1992) for more details.
Since each periodic orbit p1p2


pn for f0 in Proposition 1 does not contain the threshold value c , the
derivative df n (z )dx exists for z around pi (i 12


n ) and df n (z )dx n for such z . That is, there is a
closed neighborhood U of p1 such that p1 int U and c k0n f0k (U ) . The map f0nU is linear with slopen (01) and has a (hyperbolic) fixed point. Since given U , the sequence fn  U uniformly converges to
f0
n
  
V as goes to zero, each map fn has a fixed point in U for any sufficiently small 0. Combining this
argument with the existence theorem for topological chaos mentioned above establishes the following
proposition :
Proposition 2 : Let (01) be given . Let n 3 be an arbirary interger which is not a power of 2. Suppose
that the inequalties in (12) hold. Then there is 0 such that for each (0), the map fgiven in (7) is
topologically chaotic.
Note that Ishida and Yokoo (2004b) have made use of a similar argument to show that slight heterogeneity
among firms can induce chaotic business cycles excited by the firms’ erratic choice of innovation. See also
Hommes (1994), who introduced adaptive expectations into the conventional cobweb model with nonlinear
supply function to show that chaotic dynamics are possible. According to Proposition 2, the occurrence of
topological chaos seems to be a typical feature of the contribution rate dynamics in sense that the assumption of
heterogeneiy (0) in the agents’ costs of contributing a paper to the journal is more realistic than that of
homogeneity (0) and that topological chaos appears for a large (i.e., open) set of parameter values.
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Furthermore, the above argument for the Proposition 2 does not depend on the specific shape of the distribution
function of costs such as (4). Actually, similar results can be obtained even if we substitute e.g. the normal or
uniform distributions for the logistic distribution.
5 Some numerical experiments
In order to grasp what kind of dynamical patterns are possible for our model, we provide some numerical
simulations. Figures 2 through 4 partly demonstrate a dynamical transition from a simple stable steady state
behavior (Fig.2) to chaotic dynamics (Fig.4) via period−doubling bifurcations (Fig.3 ; period−2 cycle) as the
heterogeneity paremeter σ decreases.
The transition processes can more clearly be observed in bifurcation diagrams. Corresponding to Figures 2
through 4, Figure 5 clearly visualizes the so−called ‘period−doubling (perhaps better expressed as ‘period−
halving’) route to chaos’. This figure suggests that the rate of contribution may be more likely to behave
erratically when the potential contributors share the less heterogeneous cost structure.
As is well known, the existence of topological chaos itself does not imply that the observable dynamics are
actually ‘random−looking’. One of the most practical criteria for ‘observable chaos’ is the positiveness of the
(largest) Lyapunov exponent (if it exists), which is numerically approximated as   1
M
 
i1M log ff i1(x0)  (13)
for sufficiently large M and some appropriate initial condition x0. Roughly speaking, this indicator measures
Figure 2. A trajectory converging to the steady state.
α＝０．７, B＝１０, N＝４０, v＝２, σ＝０．３.
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some form of sensitive dependence on initial conditions (i.e., a weaker form of expansiveness), in other words,
the average ‘expandingness’ of the map along a typical trajectory on the attractor. As is expected, the frequency
of the occurrence of observable chaos (i.e.,  0) seems high for relatively small values of. See Figure 6.
It is more interesting to look at a bifurcation diagram with respect to the total payment B as it is a controllable
parameter for the decision maker. A bifurcation diagram with respect to B is plotted in Figure 7. Based on the
observation of Figure 7, complex dynamics occur for relatively small values of B . For sufficiently large values
Figure 3. Convergence to a period−two cycle.
α＝０．７, B＝１０, N＝４０, v＝２, σ＝０．２.
Figure 4. Convergence to a chaotic attractor.
α＝０．７, B＝１０, N＝４０, v＝２, σ＝０．０８.
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of B , most potential contributors, as reasonably expected, decide to contribute. Figure 8 plots the Lyapunov
exponent with respect to B .
Figure 5. Bifurcation diagram with respect to σ.
α＝０．７, B＝１０, N＝４０, v＝２.
Figure 6. Lyapunov exponent with respect to σ.
α＝０．７, B＝１０, N＝４０, v＝２.
１９５Contribution Cycles and Preferable Incentive Schemes
－４３－
6 Policy implications
6.1 Rationality versus bounded rationality
In a different context, Matsumoto (1999) assessed the “average” welfare of a cobweb economy in the presence
of chaos. In the same spirit, we compare the level of rational steady contribution rate with the average level of
boundedly rational contribution rate in the dynamical settings. Does the boundedness of rationality of potential
Figure 7. Bifurcation diagram with respect to B .
α＝０．７, N＝４０, v＝２, σ＝０．０８
Figure 8. Lyapunov exponent with respect to B .
α＝０．７, N＝４０, v＝２, σ＝０．０８
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contributors affect the long−run average rate of contribution in favor of the effectiveness of the total payment
B ? For the same set of parameter values as in Figures 5 and 6, Figure 9 shows how the rational rate and the
average boundedly rational rate vary with the total payment parameter B . In Figure 9, the average boundedly
rational rate of contribution are higher (smaller) than the rational rate of contribution for relatively small
(intermediate, respectively) values of B . For higher values of B, these rates coincide as the steady state is
stabilized for large B , as shown in Figure 5.
To build our intuition to explain why the average boundedly rational rate is higher than the rational one for
smaller B , we again take a look at the homogeneous case of   0 ; see eq. (10). Note that the threshold
c  BvN for the map f0 corresponds to the rational rate of contribution. Simple considerations show that if
0c 1, then in any trajectory x0f0(x0)f02(x0)  for initial value x0 smaller thanc 1, which
is the upper bound of the trapping region, no two consecutive points in the trajectory stay in the region at the left
of c . Thus, the average rate of contribution (if it exists) will never be less than
minp0c p f0(p ) 2  1( )2. Therefore, if B vN 1( )2, then the average boundedly rational rate
of contribution is less than the rational rate of contribution for f0.
6.2 Constant total payment versus constant per−capita payment
Is the constant total payment scheme we have discussed so far more preferable than the constant per−capita
payment syetem? An advantage of the former system over the latter one seems to be that the total amount of
payment to the actual contributors is determined in advance so that the risk in an unexpected increase in the total
expenditure for the publisher of the journal can be reduced. On the other hand, the risk for the potential
contributors is higher when the former system is adopted than the latter one.
Figure 9. (a) the average boundedly rational rate of contribution and (b) the steady
rational rate of contribution with respect to B . α＝０．７, N＝４０, v＝２, σ＝０．０８．
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In order to compare these two systems, we numerically compute the amount of per−capita payment to each
actual contributor when the constant per−capita payment scheme is adopted so as to equalize the expected total
amount of payment to the whole contributors to B . For each B , we then compute the (average) rates of
contribution for both the payment schemes to compare which one performs better.
Let b  0 be the per−capita payment to each contributor under the constant per−capita payment scheme.
Given B , the per−capita payment bb (B ) equalizing the the expected total amount of payment to B solves
the equation below :
BbNL bv   
bN 1exp v b    1. (14)
Figure 10 depicts how the rational and average boundedly rational rates of contribution under the constant total
payment scheme and the rate of contribution for bunder the constant per−capita payment scheme vary with the
total payment B .
For relatively large B , the constant per−capita payment scheme seems to be more efficient in the sense that its
performance dominates that of the constant total payment scheme for both rational and boundedly rational rates
of contribution. On the contrary, the constant total payment system seems superior for small values of B . Under
Figure 10. (a) the average boundedly rational rates of contribution under the
constant total payment scheme, (b) the steady rational rates of
contribution under the constant total payment scheme, and (c) the rate
of contribution under the constant per−capita payment scheme with
respect to B and b*＝b(B ). α＝０．７, N＝４０, v＝５, σ＝０．３．
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such specific circumstances, it may be concluded that if the budget for incentive payments is very limited, that
is, if B is supposed to be very small, the constant total payment scheme is more preferable than the constant
per−capita payment scheme.
7 Summary
In this note we have proposed a simple dynamical discrete choice model that describes the behavior of
boundedly rational agents who decide whether to contribute a paper to the journal under the constant total
payment scheme. In our settings, the model that describes the dynamics of the (expected) rate of contribution
has been formulated as a one−dimensional map from the unit interval into itself, and it has been shown,
analytically and numerically, to be capable of exhibiting periodic as well as chaotic motions. For some plausible
parameter values, our computer runs have demonstrated that for relatively small total amount of incentive
payments, the time average of the non−stationary rates of contribution tends to be larger than the steady rational
rate of contribution. We have also compared two incentive payment schemes : the constant total payment
scheme and the constant per−capita payment scheme. The first one keeps the total amount of payments to the
whole contributors constant. The second one keeps constant the amount of payment that each contributor
receives. In terms of the performance of the actual rate of contribution given that the total amount of payments
to the contributors is equalized for the both payment schemes, our numerical experiments suggest that the
constant total payment scheme is more preferable than the constant per−capita payment scheme when the total
amount of payments has to be very small.
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Contribution Cycles and Preferable Incentive Schemes
Masanori Yokoo
This note considers a situation in which the publisher of an academic journal seeks to maintain the number of
contributions to the journal by subsidizing the contributors with some incentive payments. We show that under
the incentive payment scheme that distributes some pre−determined total amount of payments equally to each
contributor (the constant total payment scheme), the number of contributions can fluctuate cyclically as well as
chaotically over time when the potential contributors form adaptive expectations. Numerical simulations
suggest, among other things, that the performance of the constant total payment scheme may be more efficient
than the constant per−capita payment scheme when the total amount of payments is supposed to be small.
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